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Abstract
When platforms compete for consumers, two types of consumer heterogeneity will
matter: consumers value the presence of other consumers on a platform diﬀerently,
and consumers contribute to the value of the platform diﬀerently. The optimal dis-
criminatory pricing policy for platforms will depend on whether those two dimensions
of consumer heterogeneity are positively or negatively correlated, which is an empirical
question. In a companion paper (Cantillon & Yin, 2008), we study membership de-
cisions of trading firms for two competing exchanges: LIFFE and DTB. Our analysis
shows that diﬀerent traders care about liquidity diﬀerently. In this paper, we estimate
the heterogeneous contribution to liquidity by diﬀerent types. We combine the esti-
mates from both papers of heterogeneous preferences and contributions to liquidity.
(JEL L1, G15; keywords derivatives exchange; network eﬀects; heterogeneity; entry
strategy; adoption; liquidity; platform competition)
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1 Introduction
Individual heterogeneity in terms of value and contribution to network eﬀects has a poten-
tially great impact on firms’ optimal strategies in terms of pricing and customer targeting.
Individuals may value network size diﬀerently but may also contribute to network eﬀects
diﬀerently, and those who value the network size most may not be those who contribute to
the network the most. The optimal discriminatory pricing policy for platforms will depend
on whether those two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity are positively or negatively cor-
related, which is an empirical question. If heavy contributors are correlated with those who
derive utility from a larger network, then a smaller network will need to subsidize those heavy
contributors to induce them to adopt its platform. That same firm should de-emphasize sub-
sidies for heavy contributors who may have a preference for somewhat illiquid markets, and
even more so for weak contributors.
Financial exchanges are a good example of an industry where network eﬀects matter:
traders value liquidity and markets attracting more traders are usually more liquid. Financial
exchanges are also a good example of an industry where user heterogeneity is likely to be
important: users (traders) diﬀer in their business models, trading motives, trading behavior,
and so on. Their needs for liquidity and contributions to trading volume vary along those
same dimensions. Understanding the role of heterogeneous traders in choosing platforms
based on diﬀerent liquidity preferences and contributing to liquidity diﬀerently are all the
more important in the current financial exchange context of consolidation, global competition
and diﬀerentiated pricing.
In a companion paper (Cantillon & Yin, 2008), we study membership decisions of trading
firms for two competing exchanges: the London International Financial Futures and Options
Exchange (LIFFE) and Deutsche Terminbörse (DTB). Our analysis shows that diﬀerent
traders care about liquidity in the Bund futures market diﬀerently; as a result, diﬀerent
types of traders became members of LIFFE or DTB at diﬀerent times.
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Variation in volume and open interest1 per member across the exchanges and over time
suggest that either (1) traders of diﬀerent types contributing diﬀerently to liquidity, or (2) the
diﬀerent mix of traders resulting in diﬀerent levels of liquidity (in other words, contributions
to liquidity are not solely a function of a trader type but of interactions with other traders), or
both. In this paper, we estimate the heterogeneous contribution to liquidity by diﬀerent types
on LIFFE and DTB. These estimates take into account the relative mix of heterogeneous
traders on the liquidity of an exchange. We then combine the estimates from both papers of
heterogeneous preferences and heterogeneous contributions to liquidity. Only by combining
estimates of the contribution of traders to liquidity and their heterogeneous valuation of
liquidity can we derive optimal pricing policies by exchanges. We find that valuations of
liquidity tend to be correlated with contributions to liquidity in this setting, which suggests
that subsidies are necessary to induce high liquidity contributors to trade on a less liquid
exchange.
Given its emphasis on user heterogeneity and pricing, the two-sided (or more appropri-
ately, multi-sided) market literature has recently explored implications of user heterogeneity
on pricing and competition theoretically (e.g. Jullien, 2001, Caillaud and Jullien, 2003 and
Jullien, 2006). The empirical literature on network eﬀects and individual heterogeneity has
been limited by the high data requirement for evaluating the sources of individual hetero-
geneity. The few papers that allow for user heterogeneity have focused on adoption (e.g.
Gowrisankaran and Stavins, 2004, Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran, 2006, Tucker, 2005) and
thus only on heterogeneity in terms of valuation of network eﬀects. The two exceptions
to our knowledge are the work of Ryan & Tucker (2008) and Tucker (2008), who consider
the importance of key individuals in the adoption by other potential users of a technology
(video conferencing) exhibiting network eﬀects. The work in these papers takes advantage of
individual level data on the social networks that influence adoption. In our setting, volume
1Open interest in a derivatives market records the number of open positions. It is used as a proxy of
liquidity because it captures the potential number of trades that are active (since traders will close their
positions at some time or the other before maturity).
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of trades generates value as opposed to specific social interactions between individuals. In
this sense, our findings are divorced from the social network structure underlying economic
interactions, and thus our findings should be considered as more appropriately generalizable
to many agent, market level settings where social networks may be less prominent drivers of
activity as opposed to within-firm settings. Moreover, our work puts together value of and
contributions to liquidity.
By design, financial markets are institutions created to foster exchange among people with
diﬀerent needs. Thus, the financial literature has long recognized the heterogeneity of traders
and the implications for liquidity. Research has focused on several diﬀerent dimensions of
heterogeneity, attempting to model the interactions between diﬀerent types of traders and
the resulting eﬀect on contributions to liquidity. Black (1986) theoretically explains the
necessity of uninformed, noise traders as trading partners for more informed traders to
generate trading volume in a market. A number of papers examine the drivers for some
traders to be liquidity providers and liquidity takers. (Grossman & Miller, 1987, Biais
1993) Others focus on risk sharing. (Cuny, 1993) A few papers focus specifically on the
diﬀerential behavior of scalpers (speculative day traders). (Silber, 1984, Kuserk & Locke,
1993) The empirical work on examining the relationship between trader types on liquidity
has generally involved micro level data on traders, where the type of the trader is well
known to the researcher. This research has show that trading behavior by diﬀerent types of
traders is influenced by factors such as volatility. For example, Locke & Sarkar (2001) find
that depending on the volatility in the market, customers may trade more with each other
than market makers. Bloomfield, O’Hara, & Saar (2003) employ experiments to test various
theories about diﬀerences in trader types along the dimensions mentioned in the literature
and the resulting trading behavior. They find that depending on the volatility in the market,
informed and noise traders may switch positions from being liquidity providers to liquidity
takers. As a result of these findings, we include controls for the volatility of the instrument
being traded. (Reiss & Werner, 2004) We will ultimately try to construct types based on
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observable characteristics of our traders that reflect the various dimensions studied in this
literature. We believe that we are the first paper to empirically match trader preferences for
liquidity with trader contributions to liquidity.
Section 2 presents our model of liquidity production. Section 3 describes our data and
presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical model, and Section 5 results
from our estimation of volume production by diﬀerent trader types. Section 6 and combines
the results from Cantillon & Yin (2008) with these estimates to examine how heterogeneous
valuations to liquidity are correlated with heterogeneous contributions to liquidity. Section
7 concludes.
2 Model
The model will essentially build on Jullien (2001 and 2006).
We model liquidity as follows:
(1) liquidityet = f(n1et, n2et,...;Zet)
where liquidityet is a measure of liquidity of exchange e in time t, n1et, n2et, ... records the
number of traders of type 1, type 2, etc. that are members of exchange e in month t, and
Zet is a vector of various other variables that attract liquidity.
Equation (1) can be seen as a production function, and we will draw on the production
function literature as we examine diﬀerent specifications for the f(.) function in Equation
(1) (for a survey, see e.g. Fuss, McFadden and Mundlak, 1978). We borrow functional
forms from the productivity literature in order to decompose our aggregate volume data into
the marginal contributions of diﬀerent types of traders interacting with each other. The
empirical productivity literature provides a nice guide for our exercise: capital, labor, and
other inputs of interest are mapped into aggregate output (typically U.S. manufacturing) (for
a survey of this work, see Chung 1994). The empirical productivity literature has grappled
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with several issues which will also be relevant to our setting (see Walters, 1963, for a survey
of generic issues in the production function literature). A primary topic of research has been
the design of more flexible functional forms for the production function. (Arrow et al., 1961,
Heady & Dillon, 1961, Christensen et al., 1973, Pollak et al., 1984)) Several studies examine
the flexibility and robustness of various production functions (Appelbaum, 1979, Berndt &
Khaled, 1979, Caves &Christensen, 1980, Guilkey et al., 1983), and we utilize their findings
to narrow our set of candidate production functions. Another issue has been the inclusion
of disembodied technical progress in the production function. Typically, the literature has
included a time regressor to control for changes in productivity that are not tied to the
particular combination of inputs at a given point in time. (Berndt and Wood, 1982) We will
also employ several controls for time and other characteristics in Zet which we believe may
drive volume separately from the interaction of trader types.
2.1 Cobb-Douglas Production Function (CD)
In this paper, we employ the Cobb-Douglas production function. The canonical CD produc-
tion function (Cobb & Douglas, 1928) can be written as follows:
(2) y = α0
KQ
k=1
xαkk , 0 < αk∀k
(3) ln y = lnα0 +
KX
k=1
αk lnxk, 0 < αk∀k
The CD is an attractive functional form since it allows for heterogeneity in how diﬀerent
types of traders contribute to liquidity and flexibility in terms of how diﬀerent types of
traders complement or substitute one another in producing liquidity. Since traders find their
counterpart to a transaction amongst all the other traders (including those of its own type),
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the CD functional form appropriately allows the marginal eﬀect of an additional type to
be a function of the number of all other types trading. If we ignore the restriction that
0 < αk for all k, then there is no restriction on the sign of the first and second derivatives.
This means that the model permits trader types to be complements or substitutes for each
other, since the cross-partial eﬀect of an extra trader can be positive or negative. Otherwise,
the model imposes both increasing marginal contributions to all additional trader types and
complementarity between all trader types.
Note that the marginal eﬀect of each trader is a function of the number of other types.
For example:
(4)
∂y
∂xi
=
αi
xi
α0
KQ
k=1
xαkk
and
(5)
∂y
∂xi∂xj
=
αiαj
xixj
α0
KQ
k=1
xαkk .
As a result, the marginal eﬀect of a type of trader will change in magnitude over time as
the mix of other traders changes. The interaction eﬀect of one type of trader with another
type will also vary in magnitude with the mix of other traders. However, the Cobb-Douglas
functional form imposes that the signs on these derivatives will remain constant over time,
as clear from the examples in Equations 4 and 5.
3 Data
Our data comes from the competition between LIFFE and DTB that played out during
the 1990s. Both exchanges oﬀered trading in the Bund future, a future on the German
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government bond, and they competed fiercely to attract members and trading volumes. For
the purposes of this paper, we focus on the period between November 1990 and April 1998.
During this period, both exchanges attracted substantial trading volumes and diﬀerent sets
of traders. The number of traders that were members of at least one exchange grew from to
172 to 222. At the same time, trading volumes of the Bund grew more than tenfold during
the 1990s. Several factors contributed to this. First, German reunification in 1990 increased
Germany’s borrowing needs. The resulting increase in the public debt fueled interest in the
future contract. Second, interest rates in the eurozone progressively converged as monetary
union took shape (the euro - which fixed exchange rates among participating countries - was
introduced on 1 January 1999). As a result, the Bund contract, which was the biggest future
on a government bond in Europe progressively attracted traders from other government bond
futures. Third, futures went from exotic financial instruments to instruments used routinely
by banks, asset management funds and corporations. The ensuing pool of liquidity attracted
speculators and arbitrageurs of all kinds.2
3.1 Firm data
We have obtained from each exchange a list of past and current members. The original
dataset from DTB contains information on 493 individual establishments that held a mem-
bership any time during the 1 January 1990 - 31 December 1999 period. The original dataset
from LIFFE contains information on 305 individual establishments that held a membership
allowing them to trade interest rate instruments (including the Bund) any time over the
same period.
We use the collected information on group ownership and mergers and acquisitions to
match establishments to groups (procedure described in Cantillon & Yin, 2008). With this
convention, our dataset covers 578 groups. On average, 362.64 groups are present in any
2Speculators trade on the basis of their forecasts about future movements of prices: they take positions,
hoping that prices will move in a direction favorable to them. Arbitrageurs speculate on the basis of price
co-movements between similar securities.
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given month (min = 315, max = 433, std deviation = 32.66).
Types will be defined on the basis of business lines only for now. Business lines proxy
for trading motives and sources of revenue.3 We partitioned the groups in our dataset into
seven business lines: universal bank, investment bank, retail bank, specialized trading firm,
asset management, brokerage, and proprietary trading firm. We distinguished banks by the
type of customers they serve. Retail banks serve primarily individual customers as well as
small and medium enterprises. Investment banks serve corporate clients as well as, often,
wealthy individuals. Universal banks serve all types of customers.
For most of their activities, investment banks compete with more focused financial firms.
Table 1 summarizes the main activities of an investment bank (IB): underwriting and merg-
ers & acquisitions, market making, brokerage services, asset management and proprietary
trading. Specialized trading firms compete with investment banks by making markets, of-
fering execution and/or clearing for institutional clients, and trading on their own account.
Asset management firms sometimes oﬀer brokerage services to a retail clientele and trade on
their own account on top of their core asset management activity. Brokerages oﬀer execution
services and sometimes also oﬀer some funds. Proprietary trading firms are firms that focus
on trading on their own account. Table 1 compares the activities covered by these firms. In
categorizing our firms, we have assigned the smallest encompassing category for each group.
Thus a group active in market making, proprietary trading and asset management would be
classified as an IB, but a group active in asset management and proprietary trading would
be classified as an asset management firm and a group active in proprietary trading and
market making would be classified as a specialized trading firm. Evaluated at the time a
group first appears in our dataset, our data contain 64 universal banks, 28 retail banks, 102
investment banks, 48 asset management firms, 95 specialized trading firms, 110 brokerages
and 131 proprietary trading firms.
3Business types also proxy for scope of products traded and size, because universal banks tend to be
larger than retail banks and investment banks on average, and investment banks tend to be bigger than
more specialized financial firms.
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Table 1: Investment banks and their competitors
Activities\Business types IB Specialist Asset Mgt Broker Proprietary
Underwriting, M&A
√
Market making
√ √
Retail brokerage
√ √
Institutional brokerage
√ √ √
Asset Management
√ √
(
√
)
Proprietary trading
√ √
(
√
)
√
Figures 1 & 2 show the changes in the mix of diﬀerent groups on each exchange. All group
types increase in number on DTB, but growth is particularly prominent among specialists and
proprietary traders. In contrast, the number of traders of each type on LIFFE remains fairly
stable over our sample period. There is a slight decline in investment bankers and proprietary
traders, and a U-shaped pattern to the number of brokers. Except for investment bankers
being the most numerous type on each exchange over the sample period, the exchanges
exhibit very diﬀerent mix of traders, and that mix changes significantly from early to late in
our sample in the case of DTB. These descriptive statistics already are highly suggestive of
the diﬀerential eﬀect that interaction between diﬀerent types of traders can have on liquidity
in the market.
3.2 Exchange data
For both exchanges, we collected the following monthly data: (1) transaction and clearing fee
per contract, (2) margins, (3) membership, and (4) trading volume in the Bund contract. Fees
and margins were collected from exchange notices to members, membership was constructed
on the basis of the information provided to us by both exchanges, and volume data come from
Datastream. Furthermore, we collected data on the interest rates for other European treasury
bonds (Germany, Spain, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom) over the January 1990 —
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December 1999 time period and calculated the normalized standard deviation between these
rates each month as a measure of the convergence of interest rates over our sample period. As
a measure of the attractiveness of the Bund future and in consideration of the importance
of volatility to traders’ liquidity contribution as highlighted in the finance literature, we
collected data on the daily yield for the underlying Bund contract (the government bond on
which the future is based) and constructed a monthly variable to capture its volatility. We
define volatility of the underlying Bund contract as the monthly standard deviation of the
yield.
We use the Deutsche Mark (DM) as the currency for all the data. Fees are converted into
DM using the monthly average exchange rate for the Pound/DM. Maturities for the Bund
are quarterly and generate three-month cycles in trading volumes. We will account for this
cyclicality with expiry month fixed eﬀects.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our exchange variables for the period between
November 1990 and April 1989. The number of month observations is 90.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics per month (all monetary values in DM)
LIFFEb DTB
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
V : volume 2.36E6 1.19E6 5.06E5 5.07E6 1.28E6 1.35E6 2.29E4 7.20E6
lnV (volume) 14.52 0.59 13.13 15.44 13.58 1.09 10.04 15.79
groups 126.89 6.33 115 151 113.66 64.51 0 303
nu: universal 20.88 1.30 19.00 23.00 20.91 3.20 17.00 28.00
nr: retail 4.43 0.98 3.00 6.00 5.94 0.64 5.00 9.00
ni: IB 50.53 2.67 43.00 55.00 32.59 3.62 28.00 38.00
ns: specialist 22.88 1.55 19.00 27.00 15.11 9.18 4.00 31.00
nb: broker 17.20 1.60 15.00 21.00 4.09 2.98 2.00 16.00
na: asset mgr 1.39 0.49 1.00 2.00 8.28 1.42 7.00 14.00
np: prop 14.37 2.31 11.00 22.00 10.92 8.49 3.00 25.00
fee 1.00 0.22 0.00 1.30 0.53 0.37 0.00 1.50
marginsa 2958.9 888.45 1500 6250 3567.33 964.1 2000 5000
volatility 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.18
convergence 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.31 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.31
a Margins refer to initial margins
b LIFFE membership restricted to those allowed to trade interest rate instruments.
4 Empirical model
To ensure greater comparability with the results of Cantillon & Yin (2008), we use the same
unit of analysis: groups (instead of individual firm members) and monthly data by exchange.
We assume that all traders of the same type are identical and that the parameters defining
their trading behavior (αk from Equations 2 & 3) are constant over time. As a baseline, we
first consider a Cobb-Douglas functional form for f from Equation 1.
Consider the 7 business types of traders in a CD functional form for Equations 2 & 3.
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Denote the number of each type of trader as nu, nr, ni, ns, nb, na, and np, respectively
for universal bank, retail bank, investment bank, specialist, broker, asset manager, and
proprietary. Let K denote the set of indices for the business types. Using volume Vet on the
exchange e per month t as our measure of liquidity, we then have
(6) Vet =
µQ
K
nαkket
¶
exp(αZet + εet)
where εet is an error term and Zet is a vector of regressors from Equation 1 that contains at
minimum 1 to generate a constant term.
Taking logs, we get
(7) lnVet =
P
K
αket lnnket +αZet + εet
We will estimate three diﬀerent versions of Equation 7. The first version (Model 1) will
only regress log volume on the log of the number of types; Zet contains only 1. In the
second version (Model 2), Zet will include an additional variable: an estimate of the monthly
eﬀect of macro-level variables on total Bund futures volume generated from a first stage
regression. The third version (Model 3) will add the exchange specific characteristics, feeet
and marginset to Zet.
The estimate of the monthly eﬀect of macro-level variables is the predicted value from a
regression of total volume of Bund futures trading on drivers of volume that are exchange-
independent. Specifically, the first stage in the estimation of Model 2 is as follows:
ln(VLIFFEt + VDTBt) = β0 + βconvergenceconvergencet + βvolatilityvolatilityt + βtrendtrenddt(8)
+βtrend2trend
2
t + βtrend3trend
3
t + βdecemberdecembert + βexpiry expiryt + εet(9)
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where trendt is linear time trend by month4, decembert is a dummy variable for every
December expiry month, and expiryt is a dummy variable for every other expiry month
excluding December.5 The purpose of this first stage is twofold: (1) we estimate the eﬀect
on total volume, rather than volume on each exchange separately, of macro events and trends
that drive Bund trading volume over our sample period, (2) we assign as much explanatory
power as possible to these macro events and trends before estimating the marginal eﬀects of
the number of diﬀerent types of bidders on volume of Bund trading on each exchange.
Note that in all models, identification of the coeﬃcients on each of the types in these
models comes strictly oﬀ of variation in the number of types across exchanges and over time
related to the variation in volume over time.
5 Estimation
The regressions employ the Cobb-Douglas model of Equation 7 and first stage estimates of
macro-drivers of liquidity from Equation 8 to estimate the average (over the sample period)
contribution to volume conditional on other variables that would aﬀect trading volume. Once
we have estimated the α coeﬃcients in Equation 7, we can then calculate the marginal eﬀect
of each time over the sample period.
Since we believe that the error terms for both of these exchanges would be correlated
in each period, we use seemingly unrelated regression to simultaneously estimate the coeﬃ-
cients on types and other control variables for each exchange. Although we control as much
as possible for drivers of volume trading associated with a time trend, expiry dates, and
macro events, the finance literature suggests that trading in one period may be correlated
with trading in the following period for reasons not captured by our regressors, so autocor-
relation of our data is also a concern. We conduct various tests for serial correlation for
4Equation 8 is also estimated excluding the polynomial terms on trendt. The coeﬃcients on the other
regressors do not change dramatically with the inclusion or exclusion of powers of the time trend, although
the adjusted R-squared does increase by 0.10 when the quadratic term is added.
5Other fixed eﬀects such as a dummy for whether a month was the first, second, or third month in the
futures contract cycle were also employed, but these alternative controls were not significant.
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each of our models. Only Model 1 exhibits a strong AR1 process, suggesting that the other
controls in Models 2 & 3 do actually control for autocorrelation. Nevertheless, to correct
for autocorrelation, we use feasible generalized least squares in combination with seemingly
unrelated regression to correct for both serial and contemporaneous correlation in all cases.
As a result, standard errors in Model 2 and Model 3 may be inflated.
Consistent with the empirical productivity literature, we may face an endogeneity prob-
lem where the number of traders on an exchange is likely the result of expectations on the
part of traders about how much volume will be on the exchange. Alternatively, membership
may be correlated with unobservable quality of the exchange that also drives trading vol-
ume. We deal with potential endogeneity in several ways, also consistent with what has been
done in the literature. (cf. Griliches & Mairesse, 1995) First, we suggest that traders make
membership decisions based on previous period volume, rather than current period volume,
so that the number of traders each period can be considered eﬀectively exogenous to trading
volume in that period. Second, we employ flexible polynomial functions of time, fixed eﬀects
for cyclicality in trading, and measures of interest rate convergence in Europe and volatility
of the Bund to control for any factors that might simultaneously drive trading volume and
trader membership. We also estimate the coeﬃcients for DTB and LIFFE separately, allow-
ing quality to interact with the regressors and generate diﬀerent marginal eﬀects for trader
types on each exchange. Finally, in a subsequent draft of this paper, we will investigate the
use instrumental variables to correct for endogeneity as a robustness check.
5.1 First stage estimates
Table 3 presents the ordinary least squares estimates for the first stage presented in Equa-
tion 8. We choose to fit the natural log of total volume, ln(VLIFFEt + VDTBt), rather than
total volume directly since our second stage estimates will be using logged volume as depen-
dent variables as well. The R-squared on this first stage indicates that already 94% of the
variation in volume over our sample period can be explained by volatility in the underlying
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Bund instrument, convergence of European interest rates, a flexible, polynomial time trend,
and expiry date fixed eﬀects. All coeﬃcients except the non-December expiry dates are
significant, and all coeﬃcients are of the expected sign. The negative sign on convergence
indicates that as interest rates converged (represented by a decrease in the convergence mea-
sure), trading in the Bund futures increased. As volatility increased, trading of the Bund
futures increased in order to hedge the riskiness in the underlying instrument. A plot of
the time trend eﬀect maps out an increasing (exponential) eﬀect on volume over our sample
period (despite linearizing the volume pattern via logs). The december expiry eﬀect picks
up the negative spikes in trading that occur each December.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
The predicted value from this first stage is presented alongside the log of total volume
in Figure 3. The per month average of macro event-predicted log of total volume is 14.89
(min = 13.16, max = 15.91, std deviation = 0.685), which is equal to the average log of
total volume per month of 14.89 (min = 13.20, max = 16.16, std deviation = 0.704). We
will employ this estimate as a regressor in our estimation of the second stage Equation 7,
Model 2.
5.2 Second stage estimates
Table 4 presents the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) combined with seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) estimates for Models 1, 2, and 3 as described in Section 4. The
dependent variable in all cases is logged volume for DTB or LIFFE. Although reported,
the use of SUR invalidates the typically calculated R-squared. Instead, graphical evidence
of goodness of fit are presented. The estimates from Table 4 are transformed to generated
predicted values for volume on DTB and LIFFE, and those are plotted alongside the observed
volumes. In the interests of space, only the plots for LIFFE and DTB from Model 3 are
presented; the fits are similarly close for Models 1 and 2 as well.
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Figure 3: Comparison of dependent variable (log of total Bund futures volume) and predicted
value from first stage regression on macro events. The predicted value will be employed as
a regressor in the second stage estimation of exchange volumes on trader types.
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INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
The coeﬃcients on most of the types in all three models are positive, indicating that
adding a trader general increases liquidity. The one consistent exception is proprietary
traders, who on both exchanges and in all three models has a negative eﬀect on volume.
The interpretation of a negative coeﬃcient is that proprietary traders are substitutes for
other traders: rather than contribute to liquidity, they actually detract from liquidity by
substituting for other traders as a counterpart and trading less than those other traders
would trade. The presence of an additional proprietary trader therefore decreases the total
number of transactions. As can be seen from Equation 5, proprietary traders are substitutes
for every other type that has a positive coeﬃcient, since the interaction eﬀect of the two
types will be negative. The magnitudes of the coeﬃcients indicate the percentage change in
volume as a result of a percentage change in the number of a given type. Using the coeﬃcient
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on universal types in Model 1, a 1% increase in the number of universal banks will translate
into a 3.5% increase in trading volume.
It is hard to interpret the coeﬃcients from Table 4, since the marginal eﬀects depend on
the values of all other variables at that point in time (cf. Equations 4 and 5). The easiest
way to interpret the results of the Cobb-Douglas estimates is to calculate the marginal
contribution to volume on each exchange in each month based on the observed values of all
the regressors (number of business types and exchange and market characteristics) in that
month (cf. Equation 4). We present the results from Model 3 only. As can be seen in
Figures 6 and 7, there is quite a bit of variation in the contribution to volume of each type.
On DTB, the largest contributors to liquidity are retail banks, followed by asset managers
and then universal banks. Early in our sample period, however, specialists are on par with
universal banks for contributions to liquidity. Brokerages and investment banks contribute
very little to liquidity, while proprietary traders seem to act as substitutes to all other traders,
with each extra trader reducing the amount of liquidity. The marginal trader contributions
for Models 1 & 2 are similar except that asset managers are also substitutes rather than
complements to other traders. On LIFFE, asset managers are the biggest contributors
to liquidity, although their eﬀect diminishes at the end of the sample period. The next
largest contributors are investment banks, followed by retail and universal banks. Specialists,
brokers, and proprietary traders all seem to be substitutes in this market.
As we move from Model 1 to Model 2 and add predicted volume from macro events, we
see that the number of significantly estimated coeﬃcients on trader types falls sharply. The
signs and magnitudes of the type coeﬃcients do not change dramatically, and given the lack
of precision with which some coeﬃcients are estimated, they are not significantly diﬀerent
from each other. The sign on macro events in Models 2 & 3 are significant and the right sign.
The signs on fees and margins are also significant and the correct sign except in the case of
fees for LIFFE: we would expect volume of trading to decrease with higher transaction fees
and higher margins.
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Figure 6: Calculations of the marginal contribution to liquidity of each business type to
volume on DTB given observed values of each regressor in each month.
These results already suggest that diﬀerent traders contribute to liquidity diﬀerently, and
so exchanges should take into account the type of trader and mix of trader types when trying
to assess which traders to target and subsidize (if any).
6 Value vs. contribution to liquidity
Figure 8 combines the results about trader preferences for liquidity from Cantillon & Yin
(2008) with the calculations of marginal contributions to liquidity from the estimates in
Model 3. A coeﬃcient for each business types’ preference for liquidity was estimated in
Cantillon & Yin (2008). These preference are plotted along the y-axis. The value of the
marginal contribution to liquidity in the first period of our sample for DTB are plotted along
the x-axis. Figure 8 suggests that in a few cases, preferences for liquidity are correlated with
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Figure 7: Calculations of the marginal contribution to liquidity of each business type to
volume on LIFFE given observed values of each regressor in each month.
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contributions to liquidity. This pattern is consistent with the logic that types who trade a
lot are likely to seek a platform with greater liquidity to absorb their trades. Holding the
mix of other traders constant, if DTB wanted to attract retail banks and asset managers for
their liquidity contribution behavior, DTB would likely have to subsidize their memberships
since they tend to care more about liquidity than other types, and thus may be reluctant
to leave the incumbent exchange. Brokers care a great deal about liquidity but contribute
relatively little. This suggest that they may represent more hedging than asset managers or
retail banks, and therefore value liquidity but do not trade in large volumes. Relative to asset
managers and retail banks, DTB does not need to expend as many resources targeting brokers
or retail banks, since they likely require high subsidies to switch to a low liquidity platform
but do not contribute much to liquidity. Proprietary, investment banks, and specialists are
the types who may find DTB relatively more attractive. Given the mix of traders on DTB
early in our sample, specialists and proprietary traders also are relatively larger contributors
to liquidity than other types, so these traders who were particularly valuable to DTB early
on also are easier to attract. When we compare these correlations with the initial members
that opened DTB, the mix of traders adopting DTB may have been able to improve upon
their initial liquidity growth. DTB opened in February 1990 with 13 investment banks, 10
universal banks, 7 asset managers, 4 retail banks, and 1 proprietary trader. DTB may have
done better if they had invited more retail banks and specialists than investment banks.
Investment banks seem less discouraged by lower liquidity than specialists; given that there
were approximately 100 groups of both types existing in February 1990, it would have been
better to court more of the specialists than the investment banks. Our results suggest
potentially more eﬀective targeting of initial membership composition for DTB at the time
of its entry.
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Figure 8: Preference for and contribution to liquidity by type. Contribution is plotted along
the x-axis, and the corresponding preference for liquidity is plotted along the y-axis.
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7 Conclusion
This paper estimates the coeﬃcients on a Cobb Douglas production function that links
the mix of trader types on an exchange to the volume on that exchange. Those estimates
are used to calculate the marginal contribution to liquidity by each trader type conditional
on the mix of other trader types present on the exchange. By combining these results with
estimates of trader types’ preferences for liquidity, we find evidence suggestive of better entry
strategies with respect to subsidization and targeting of initial members by DTB during their
competitive entry in the Bund futures trading market. By choosing a diﬀerent set of initial
members, DTB may have been able to generate liquidity faster than was accomplished with
its observed choice of initial members.
In future versions of this paper, we would like to enrich the specification for unobserv-
able member characteristics. The motivation for why diﬀerent traders contribute to liquidity
comes from our understanding of how trading behavior varies with trading motives (hedging,
arbitrage, speculation, brokerage). In practice, our observable trader characteristics imper-
fectly proxy for this trading behavior. We will refine the empirical approach by adding a
(logit) probability function of being one of these four types of traders (hedger, arbitrageur,
speculator or broker) based on observable characteristics. The probability function will be
jointly estimated with the production function (now based on these four types).
As a second attempt to infer information about trading motives from observable infor-
mation, we will integrate information on the level of open interest. Diﬀerent trading motives
have diﬀerent implications for how trading volumes related to open interest, and the level of
open interest reveals something about the mix of traders.
The Cobb-Douglas function already allows for complementary and substitutability among
trader types. We will nevertheless consider its extension, the translog function, that allows
for richer patterns of interactions.
With the empirical results at hand, we will be able to identify which aspects of the Jullien
(2001, 2006) are most in need of extension to derive normative interpretations of our results
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and suggest interesting counterfactuals.
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Table 3: OLS results for first stage regression of log of total Bund volume per month on macro variables 
   
ln(VLIFFE + VDTB) 
 
convergence  ‐2.231* 
0.544 
 
volatility  2.976* 
0.556 
 
trend  0.085* 
0.011 
 
trend2 ‐0.001* 
0.000 
 
trend3  0.000* 
0.000 
 
december  ‐0.431* 
0.064 
 
expiry  ‐2.231* 
0.544 
 
constant  2.976* 
0.556 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.942 
 
No. of obs. 
 
90 
 
 
Standard errors are presented below coefficient estimates in italics. *significant @ 5% 
Table 4: FGLS+SUR results for Cobb Douglas model of business type contributions to logged volume/month on DTB & LIFFE 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Trader types  DTB   LIFFE   DTB   LIFFE   DTB   LIFFE  
lnUniversal  3.462*
0.872 
5.681*
0.928 
1.359†
0.717 
1.579†
0.890 
0.884
0.597 
0.236
0.917 
lnRetail  2.440*
0.424 
0.263
0.172 
2.202*
0.339 
0.278*
0.136 
1.250*
0.319 
0.043
0.157 
lnInvestmentBank  0.523
1.288 
‐1.486
1.003 
‐0.322
1.021 
1.248
0.839 
‐0.098
0.850 
1.141
0.821 
lnSpecialist  0.909*
0.266 
0.998*
0.484 
0.141
0.226 
0.018
0.393 
0.248
0.189 
‐0.173
0.400 
lnBroker  0.136
0.206 
‐0.105
0.505 
0.139
0.165 
0.080
0.409 
‐0.003
0.138 
‐0.258
0.390 
lnAssetManager  ‐1.041*
0.422 
0.465*
0.151 
‐0.327
0.341 
0.173
0.122 
1.152*
0.363 
0.130
0.120 
lnProprietary  ‐0.462*
0.190 
‐1.991*
0.255 
‐0.124
0.162 
‐0.331
0.288 
‐0.289*
0.135 
‐0.602*
0.305 
Macro events   
predicted  
lnTotalVolume 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐  0.973*
0.110 
0.717*
0.076
1.021*
0.096 
0.736*
0.073 
Exchange specific controls   
Fees  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐  ‐0.394*
0.080 
0.075
0.093 
Margins  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐  ‐9.56E‐5*
0.000 
‐9.56E‐5*
0.000 
constant  ‐2.333
4.941 
5.043
6.738 
‐7.368†
3.908 
‐5.706
5.548
‐8.049*
3.252 
0.786
5.672 
Reported R2  0.999  0.999     0.999  0.999     0.999  0.999 
No. of obs.  89  89  89 
 
Standard errors are presented below coefficient estimates in italics. *significant @ 5%, †significant at 10% 
